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This issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases contains 2 articles that address critical elements of implementing 
large-scale local-level vaccination programs in response 
to a public health emergency. In addition to describing ac-
tivities undertaken during the 2009 pandemic of influenza 
A(H1N1) virus (pH1N1) and subsequent program evalua-
tion and lessons learned, the articles highlight the critical 
role for scientific evaluation in improving our ability to re-
spond to emergencies (1,2).
Saha et al. report on assessment of the efficiency of 
public health–managed large-scale vaccination clinics, 
referred to as points of dispensing (PODs), to administer 
pH1N1 vaccine in densely populated Los Angeles County, 
California, USA (3). The authors examined rates of visits 
to PODs according to patients’ socioethnic characteris-
tics and assessed factors affecting vaccination throughput 
(doses administered per hour). Their evaluation provides 
information about optimal placement of PODs in the 
community and possible strategies to improve their opera-
tional efficiency.
Marcello et al. describe the experience of New York 
City, New York, USA, in using its Citywide Immunization 
Registry to capture information about pH1N1 vaccine dos-
es administered during the response (4). Immunization in-
formation systems (IISs) are commonly used to document 
administration of recommended childhood vaccinations; 
however, routine adult participation has historically been 
low (5). During New York City’s pH1N1 vaccination pro-
gram, the health department required all providers to reg-
ister with the Citywide Immunization Registry and report 
doses administered. The New York City experience demon-
strates the feasibility and potential usefulness of expanding 
mandatory IIS reporting to all types of providers during 
a pandemic influenza vaccination program as a means of 
monitoring progress and managing supply and distribution. 
The article also reveals limitations of IISs as they existed 
in 2009 and 2010.
Los Angeles County and New York City were able 
to conduct meaningful program evaluation because pub-
lic health officials had the foresight to incorporate evalu-
ation into emergency planning and response and commit 
valuable time and resources to conduct health services re-
search during the height of pH1N1 vaccination. Los An-
geles County health officials coordinated a meticulous 
data collection effort from 101 POD events held during a 
6-week period from October through December 2009. In 
New York City, a substantial outreach and education pro-
gram was necessary to incorporate providers of vaccines 
to adults and others not accustomed to IIS reporting into 
the program to acquire the most comprehensive and timely 
information possible about vaccine doses administered.
For health departments, the decision to commit to 
planning for and conducting research and evaluation dur-
ing a public health emergency is complicated by the com-
peting priority of providing direct services to persons and 
populations in need. In addition to balancing the effort 
needed to plan and conduct the public health response and 
the research or evaluation effort, other uncertainties im-
pose limitations on research efforts during emergencies. In 
the case of research conducted during the 2009 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic, the inherent difficulty of projecting 
demand for vaccination, combined with delays and uncer-
tainty around the timing of availability of pH1N1 vaccine, 
were serious challenges for the vaccination program and 
for its evaluation (6). 
Although researchers have to make assumptions about 
the event under study, a high degree of flexibility is neces-
sary. Public health emergencies often present unforeseen 
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circumstances and influenza pandemics are among the least 
predictable of all emergencies. Public health priorities dur-
ing a pandemic response can change quickly on the basis 
of disease characteristics, resource constraints, and the po-
tential for social disruption. Planning evaluation efforts for 
different pandemic scenarios and being nimble enough to 
rapidly adapt to shifting priorities are essential qualities for 
any research and evaluation program. Research planners 
need to be able to identify and address key response ques-
tions under conditions of much less certainty than in other 
research efforts.
Despite these challenges, invaluable knowledge is 
gained from well-planned and well-conducted (and ap-
propriately resourced) health services research during an 
event. Tabletop and functional exercises are useful tools 
for organizations to expand knowledge, assess readiness, 
and identify deficiencies (7,8). Yet they rarely approach 
the intensity, complexity, and duration of a real event. Data 
obtained during a response to an actual public health emer-
gency provide the best (and perhaps only) source of infor-
mation for program evaluation under conditions in which 
the public health system is severely stressed. To address 
knowledge gaps in preparedness, public health authorities 
must strike an appropriate balance between conducting re-
search, evaluating program efforts, and providing services 
during a public health emergency (2). Publishing the results 
of such evaluations is also essential to permit others who 
are planning vaccination campaigns during emergencies to 
benefit from the experiences in Los Angeles County and 
New York City.
Human infection with influenza A(H3N2) variant virus 
(9) and avian influenza A(H7N9) virus (10) and continued 
sporadic cases of infection with highly pathogenic avian 
influenza A(H5N1) virus (11)—all viruses with pandemic 
potential—remind us that we must remain vigilant in our 
preparedness. We encourage health officials and leaders of 
health care organizations at all levels to identify the criti-
cal questions that will affect future emergencies and design 
research efforts into emergency preparedness planning to 
take advantage of these rare opportunities to learn and im-
prove the nation’s response capability. For vaccination pro-
grams during influenza pandemics, priorities for evaluation 
include the following: efforts to improve situational aware-
ness; efforts to identify and vaccinate populations priori-
tized for vaccination, including vulnerable populations and 
groups prioritized because of occupation; strategies to bal-
ance vaccine allocation to the existing, largely private, vac-
cination system, with large-scale vaccination venues (i.e., 
PODs); and strategies to build systems for pandemic in-
fluenza response that also improve seasonal influenza vac-
cination programs.
Although we recognize that smaller and less well-
resourced organizations may be challenged in their ability 
to conduct large-scale sophisticated evaluation, we believe 
that learning by doing is possible for any organization, pro-
vided leaders and planners are willing to make the commit-
ment. Even modest evaluation efforts will increase knowl-
edge and advance preparedness.
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